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ABSTRACT
Law enforcement agencies across the United States are establishing real-time crime
centers (RTCCs) at a rapid rate, yet research exploring the decisions to establish them is lacking.
This master’s thesis therefore attempts to fill that void by using a mixed methods approach to
examine whether adaptive organizational theories, consisting of contingency theory (Lawrence
& Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965), resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), can be used to explain a
law enforcement agency’s decision to set up an RTCC. This cross-sectional mixed methods
design comprised two different studies (Study 1 & Study 2). Study 1 consisted of a content
analysis of newspaper articles (N = 235) that listed the terms “real-time crime center” or “real
time crime center”. The content analysis revealed that both resource dependency theory and
contingency theory were likely factors for a law enforcement agency’s decision to establish an
RTCC. Study 2 included interviews of agency leaders of Florida law enforcement departments
that had established an RTCC (N = 11) and those that had not (N = 2). A qualitative analysis of
the interviews with agency leaders indicates that traditional organizational theories may not fully
explain law enforcement agencies’ adoption of RTCCs. The interviews partially confirmed the
content analysis of newspaper articles while revealing a theme of front-line and midmanagement influence on decision-making. This study found that internal lower-ranking
“champions,” not external forces, are the primary reason law enforcement agencies are
establishing RTCCs, a term known as institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio 1988; Eisenstadt,
1980). This study is important because it provides a foundation for explaining why law
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enforcement agencies choose to set up RTCCs, a law enforcement organizational element whose
establishment across the United States does not appear to be slowing anytime soon. This study
also highlights an aspect of institutional theory not found in the criminal justice literature. Lastly,
limitations and future directions for research are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the New York Police Department (NYPD) created a new section within the
police department called a real-time crime center (RTCC). In this new center, NYPD would
leverage the technological infrastructure implemented after the September 11 terrorist attacks
and repurpose the technology to detect crimes in progress. Since the founding of the original
NYPD RTCC, the pace at which law enforcement agencies have been establishing RTCCs seems
to be increasing, yet there has been almost no research to determine the organizational factors
behind why agencies are choosing to establish RTCCs.
Researchers have conceptualized organizational change along two broad categories:
process and content. Process describes how changes occur. Content describes how the
organization changed. From these concepts, two organizational schools of thought have
developed. The first is based on the idea that organizations change through a process of natural
selection. When environmental change occurs, some organizations will fail and quickly be
replaced by newer organizations that are more in tune with the current environment. Eventually,
these organizations will also fail and be replaced by more modern organizations. This process
continually repeats itself. Popular theories associated with this explanation of organizational
change include organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and evolutionary economics
(Nelson & Winter, 2004). The other popular school of thought is that instead of failing,
organizations will adapt to their new environment, a process referred to as organizational
adaption.
Organizational adaption is built on the idea that managers can assess their environment
and look for opportunities that will be successful, thus increasing the chances of their
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organization’s survival (Sarta et al., 2021). Organizational adaption looks at purposeful change
between the organization and the environment and does not look at change from a strategic
perspective (Sarta et al., 2021). Popular theories falling under the adaptation camp include
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975), resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003), institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and contingency
theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Woodward et al., 1965). The theories associated with
organizational adaptation are those that will be examined as part of this study to understand why
Florida law enforcement agencies are establishing RTCCs.
Understanding why law enforcement agencies are changing and establishing RTCCs is
important because RTCCs appear to incorporate a new shift in policing. This shift seems to use
technology that focuses on identifying crimes as they occur and data mining intelligence sources
to provide as much information as possible as quickly as possible to responding officers.
Therefore, this study will attempt to answer the following questions:
1)

Is responding to and investigating crime in “real time” the primary reason

why Florida law enforcement agencies are creating RTCCs?
2)

Did external factors (e.g., elected officials, clergy, judges, community

leaders, etc.) play a role in the Florida law enforcement agency’s decision to establish an
RTCC?
3)

Did internal factors play a role in the Florida law enforcement agency’s

decision to establish an RTCC?
4)

Do RTCCs stand alone, or if they interact with organizations, with whom

do they interact and how frequently?
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It is important to identify the internal and external factors, if any, causing Florida law
enforcement agencies to establish RTCCs because RTCCs may represent an innovative form of
policing. This new form of policing may be a departure from the two traditional forms, namely
reactive and proactive policing.
How a law enforcement agency establishes its RTCC could determine whether it is
breaking from the two traditional forms of proactive and reactive policing or using the RTCC to
enhance them. In reactive policing, the three main functions of law enforcement include routine
patrol, immediate response to calls, and follow-up investigations (Cordner & Sheehan, 1999).
On the opposite end of the spectrum from reactive policing is proactive policing.
Proactive policing can be defined as “all policing strategies that have as one of their goals the
prevention or reduction of crime and disorder and that are not reactive in terms of focusing
primarily on uncovering ongoing crime or on investigating or responding to crimes once they
have occurred” (National Academy of Sciences, 2018, pp. 1, 30). Developed in the 1960s in
response to rising crime rates, social unrest, and questions regarding whether current police
practices were effective, proactive policing consists of four approaches (Braga & Weisburd,
2006; Bundy, 1970; Kelling & Coles, 1996; Weisburd et al., 2021). The four approaches include
place-based approaches, problem-solving approaches, community-based approaches, and personfocused approaches (Weisburd et al., 2019). Of these proactive policing approaches, place-based
approaches appear to be most closely aligned with the concepts associated with RTCCs. In
place-based approaches, law enforcement seeks to focus resources on certain locations within the
department’s jurisdiction. The emphasis on a particular location allows the police department to
concentrate on the causes of crime and deploy limited resources as effectively as possible (Braga
& Weisburd, 2006; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd et al., 2008). Popular police strategies
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associated with place-based approaches include using closed-circuit cameras, hot spots policing,
and predictive policing (Weisburd et al., 2008).
When an agency engages in proactive policing, a significant shift occurs because in
reactive policing, citizens determine when to involve the police, while in proactive policing, law
enforcement determines the placement of resources, patrol areas, and other enforcement
activities without the input from citizens (Waddington, 1993). Popular examples of proactive
policing include intelligence-led policing (ILP) and COMPSTAT.
In responding to crimes in progress, initiated by RTCCs, the traditional models of
reactive or proactive policing may not apply, so understanding the organizational decisions
behind the creation of RTCCs is important as this may be the future of policing in the United
States. When RTCCs are utilized, officers are still notified of crimes, but RTCCs can begin data
mining for intelligence, often before officers are dispatched. This assistance could consist of
photos or videos of suspects, photos of stolen vehicles, or other analytical assistance designed to
aid the patrol officers with the call they are currently investigating.
This study aims to explain the history of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and COMPSTAT
and how both these proactive policing models laid the foundation for the creation of RTCCs.
Popular organizational theories will be compared and used to explain possible reasons as to why
law enforcement agencies are creating RTCCs. The paper will discuss how the data were collected
and how the challenges of not having a substantial body of prior research on RTCCs were
overcome to formulate interview questions. Results of the analysis of the data will be presented
and discussed. Finally, recommendations for future research will be offered with the goal of
expanding the body of knowledge associated with RTCCs.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Approaches to Proactive Policing
Intelligence Led Policing
The history of ILP can be traced to the early 1980s and 1990s United Kingdom, where
police agencies were forced to find creative ways to tackle increased crime threats, including
domestic terrorism threats and pressure to decrease crimes while being fiscally conservative
(Ratcliffe, 2016). After the September 11 attacks, ILP was considered the most recent trend to
diffuse throughout federal, state and local police departments across the United States (Oliver,
2006; Ratcliffe, 2016).
The central tenets of ILP were adopted and refined by the Kent Police Department into
what we know today as ILP (Ratcliffe, 2016). The Kent model consists of several tenets
including focusing on the most serious criminal offenders. With ILP, management decisions
become much clearer regarding which offenders require increased attention (Audit Commission,
1993). ILP also allows law enforcement supervisors to rapidly identify crimes that warrant
further investigation. Deploying staff to screen calls and reduce duplication enables investigators
to focus on crimes that truly warrant increased attention and screen out those offering no
apparent benefit to the overall mission (Heaton, 2000). Since ILP puts such a heavy emphasis on
supervisors to promptly identify crimes and criminals that warrant additional attention,
supervisors benefit from having a complete picture of the crimes and criminals as soon as
possible. As a result, ILP puts a greater emphasis on intelligence-gathering investigative
techniques, such as surveillance and the use of informants. Surveillance and intelligence received
from informants will often fill in the gaps of the picture, thus allowing supervisors to make the
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most informed decision possible regarding which crimes require further attention. Finally, when
a law enforcement agency subscribes to the ILP model, the intelligence function of the agency
must be at the core of all decision-making (Ratcliffe, 2016).
At its core, ILP is about reducing crime associated with organized groups or prolific
offenders, but it does not change the way this task is performed. However, ILP does change how
law enforcement agencies use data to become smarter in the allocation of resources and
organizational priorities (Shearing & Wood, 2007). While ILP is offender-specific, COMPSTAT,
another proactive model of policing, focuses on crime events and police accountability (Ratcliffe,
2016).

COMPSTAT
COMPSTAT was created in 1994 by NYPD Commissioner William Bratton, and it was
hailed as a technological advancement in crime fighting that combined crime analysis and
geographic information systems with cutting-edge management principles (Willis et al., 2007).
While there is no universal meaning of the term COMPSTAT, most people believe it means
computerized statistics or computer comparison statistics (Maple & Mitchell, 1999; Vito, et al.,
2005; Walsh, 2005). The main purpose of COMPSTAT was to bring accountability to NYPD’s
76 police commanders (Magers, 2004), and when New York’s major crimes fell by 50% from
1993 to 1998, COMPSTAT was heralded as the reason (Walsh, 2001).
COMPSTAT consisted of four principles that empowered law enforcement commanders
to make changes that were responsive to emerging crime trends. The four principles were (1)
accurate and timely information available to all department members; (2) focused law
enforcement tactics for a specific crime problem; (3) rapid, focused deployment of law

6

enforcement officers to address the specific crime problem; and (4) continual assessment to
ascertain whether the applied strategies produced the intended effect (McDonald, 2004; Safir,
n.d., as citied in Willis et al., 2007). Unlike ILP that did not change the way law enforcement
agencies performed their tasks, COMPSTAT compelled police commanders to understand
ongoing crime problems in a way that allowed them to implement tactics to effectively combat
them. COMPSTAT shifted the focus from crime offenders to crime events (Ratcliffe, 2008). This
aspect of COMPSTAT meant failure in successfully dealing with crime problems, leading to a
situation where the commanders who succeeded kept their jobs and those who did not adequately
address the crime problems were replaced (Vito & Walsh, 2005). COMPSTAT was unique in
that crime problems were addressed by mid-level managers instead of patrol officers as in other
proactive policing models (Ratcliffe, 2008). Ratcliffe (2008) argues that COMPSTAT is easy to
define and adopt since most of the changes occur at the managerial level, thus not requiring a
large cultural change at the patrol level.
COMPSTAT was hailed as a transformative shift in policing that was designed to
overcome the bureaucratic dysfunction often seen in police departments. The excitement that
surrounded COMPSTAT quickly came to the attention of police leaders and policymakers across
the country, ensuing a rapid diffusion across law enforcement agencies (Henry, 2003). Despite
the positive attention COMPSTAT received, at least one study indicates that agencies did not
adopt COMPSTAT to improve their effectiveness as law enforcement agencies but rather to
appear progressive and successful (Willis et al., 2007). While ILP and COMPSTAT provide law
enforcement managers and supervisors data to explain the types of crimes that are occurring and
who is committing them, they do little in assisting patrol officers with investigating crimes in
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“real time” or improving officer safety. RTCCs, however, do seem to augment at least some
aspects of COMPSTAT and ILP.
RTCCs seem to rely heavily on the use of CCTV cameras, which is analogous to the
using surveillance to gather intelligence on criminals and criminal organizations. However, an
RTCC does not appear to be a mechanism for informing supervisors which criminals or criminal
organizations the agency should direct its resources toward. Additionally, an RTCC does not
seem to be a mechanism designed to collect and analyze puzzle pieces that could give law
enforcement command staff reasons why crime is occurring or the best way to deal with a
particular crime problem.
RTCCs appear to be designed to deal with crimes in progress and once they are over,
staff move on to the next call. RTCCs exhibit both similarities and differences with the
COMPSTAT model. A central feature of RTCCs is getting accurate and timely information to
officers responding to calls. This information is gained from CCTV cameras and other
intelligence from law enforcement databases regarding crimes in progress. In this sense, RTCC
and COMPSTAT share the feature of providing timely and accurate information to first-line
officers. However, an RTCC does not seem to be an accountability mechanism or a proactive
model attempting to move law enforcement assets around based on a specific crime problem.
Instead, once an RTCC detects a crime or is notified of a crime, RTCC employees can search
massive databases that hold large volumes of information and look for information that could
assist with the crimes being investigated. The data searches are paired with sensor data, including
closed-circuit camera footage, license plate scanners, and gunshot detection warning systems. All
this information is presented in such a way that it is easy to understand and relay to responding
officers. The data is stored in a way that facilitates dissemination to investigators already in the
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field. According to the City of New York, the goal of the RTCC “is to give police officers and
detectives current, comprehensive information in order to improve policing” (New York City
Global Partners’ Innovation Exchange, 2006, Goals and Objectives, para 1). ILP and
COMPSTAT can be used to explain how law enforcement agencies deal with and respond to
crime, but they do not explain the internal or external factors associated with why law
enforcement agencies undergo change.
Since law enforcement agencies do not operate in a vacuum, the environment that they
operate in often affect the decisions their leaders make. When presented with internal or external
changes in their environment, law enforcement agencies can either simply cease activities and
choose not to deal with the changing environment or adapt to the changes in the environment.
Given their role in society, law enforcement agencies cannot simply cease operating and are
instead better positioned to adapt to the changes. Therefore, organizational theories dealing with
adaptational change, such as contingency theory, resource dependency theory, and institutional
theory, are better suited to explain the internal and external pressures that cause law enforcement
agencies to undergo change.
Historically, law enforcement agencies have been resistant to change, but given the state
of policing in the United States today, they have almost been forced to change in order to adapt
to the internal and external pressures placed on them (Ratcliffe, 2008). When examining an
agency that created an RTCC partly due to external pressures, institutional theory can be applied
to explain why an agency may choose to establish an RTCC. Technology plays a vital role in
RTCCs, and the search to acquire or partner with organizations to obtain the necessary
technology reveals that resource dependency theory may be useful in determining why agencies
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are creating RTCCs. Further, in the examination of changes due to environmental factors,
contingency theory may be beneficial.
By selecting organizational theories that offer the flexibility to explore why agencies are
or are not implementing RTCCs, researchers have the best opportunity to examine what internal
or external factors are influencing an organization’s decision when it comes to the implementation
of RTCCs. The following will be a review of contingency theory, resource dependency theory,
interorganizational relationships (IORs), and institutional theory. Table 1 in Appendix A provides
a summary of each of the key elements of the organizational theories discussed in this study.

Contingency Theory
Contingency theory can help explain why agencies choose to establish RTCCs. This is a
prominent organizational theory that is often used to study organizational structures in law
enforcement. Contingency theory states that law enforcement agencies must continually change
for them to be effective. Agencies change when the environment in which they operate changes
in some way, and they must change to adjust to the new environment (Pennings, 1987).
Contingency theorists argue that organizations must adapt to their environment to achieve
high performance, thus ensuring their survival (Donaldson, 2001; Woodward et al., 1965).
Contingency theory consists of three core elements: the contingencies; the organization’s
structure; and a proper fit between the organizational structure and the contingencies
(Donaldson, 2001). Contingencies include the environment (Burns & Stalker, 1961), the size of
the organization (Child, 1975), and the organization’s strategy (Chandler, 1962). Having the
proper fit between the organizational structure and the contingencies ensures the organization
stays fit, which subsequently leads to high performance (Van de Ven & Drazin, 1985).
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When an organization decides to change, that decision may be based on internal or
external factors or a combination of both. Therefore, any effective organizational change requires
fit to the contingency factors present in the environment (Donaldson, 2001; Van de Ven &
Drazin, 1985; Pennings, 1987). Failing to account for the environmental contingencies may
cause organizational change to lead to programs that do not get fully implemented or cause the
organization to operate at low performance (Hollenbeck et al., 2002). If an agency in a law
enforcement setting does not evolve according to changes in the environment, it may be seen as
not being effective.
Not adapting to such environmental contingencies can cause a law enforcement agency to
fall out of fit, which could in turn hurt the department’s overall effectiveness. Three types of
environmental factors have been identified in the literature on contingency theory. The first is the
adaptation to the task environment, the second is the adaptation to new technology, and the third
is the adaptation to the scale of production (Zhao et al., 2010).
These adaptations described by contingency theory can be applied to agencies that have
decided to establish RTCCs. Contingency theory would suggest that agencies within a certain
environment, such as a heavily populated, urban downtown area with sufficient infrastructure to
support a robust camera system, would be more inclined to establish an RTCC. Likewise, a larger
agency with access to greater resources and a bigger budget would be more likely to set up an
RTCC. Finally, an agency that is forward-thinking, used to adapting to change, and more readily
available to embrace technology would be more likely to establish an RTCC. Using contingency
theory to examine an organization’s decisions to establish an RTCC allows the primary
investigator to explore the internal and external factors that may have led the organization to
believe they had fallen out of fit and why the establishment of an RTCC was needed to restore fit.
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Resource Dependency Theory
While contingency theory explores the idea of fit and organizational adaptation to regain
fit, resource dependency theory deals with the interaction between agencies to acquire resources.
Resource dependency theory helps explain whether RTCCs stand alone or whether they interact
with organizations. This theory views organizations as an open system, where contingencies in
the external environment affect the way in which they operate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). When
examining organizations, resource dependency theorists recognize that internal forces and the
values and beliefs of the organization’s leadership matter, but the decisions made at an
organizational level are often based on external forces present in the organizational environment
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).
Resource dependency theory states that if an organization wants to survive, it must obtain
the necessary resources needed to be seen as legitimate. Ensuring this survival often means
partnering with another organization to obtain the necessary resources (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003). Such partnership between two organizations may cause one organization to change
certain aspects of its features, such as its structure or leadership, to continue to acquire resources
essential for their survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Since resources are being consumed by
the organization, society is constantly evaluating if the organization’s outputs are worthy of the
resources being utilized (Parsons, 1956). As such, Parsons argued that legitimacy is essential for
an organization’s survival. The legitimacy need not be unanimous across the entire citizenry;
however, it is required across a broad coalition of society members who contribute the necessary
resources and benefit from the outputs (Parsons, 1956).
Since an organization is part of a larger social system and obtain necessary support from
that system for survival, the organization’s goals, activities, and outputs must be acceptable to
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the larger social system (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Maurer (1971, p. 361) defines legitimation as
“the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist,
that is, to continue to import, transform, and export energy, materials, or information.” It is
important to note that individuals outside the organization bestow legitimacy upon the
organization. Therefore, it is crucial that these individuals interpret the actions of the
organization and deem them within the norms of social values (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Since
individuals who are not a part of the organization determine its legitimacy, the organization’s
leadership serves an important role in assuring that the organizational environment is in line with
the social norms and values, thus taking active measures to ensure social legitimacy (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 2003). These measures ensure that social norms or environmental changes are dealt
with accordingly before the organization loses any legitimacy. The internal and external factors
that organizations evaluate in their quest for resources to be seen as legitimate can be applied to
law enforcement agencies that have or have not chosen to establish RTCCs.
With regard to RTCCs, resource dependency theory would suggest that law enforcement
agencies that are not seen as legitimate may partner with other agencies that have already
established RTCCs to be perceived as more legitimate. With technology playing such a large role
in RTCCs, resource dependency can be used to explain any external changes an agency
undergoes to be seen as more legitimate to outside entities. These changes may become vital as
agencies seek to increase access to technology and data. A law enforcement agency will want to
partner with as many outside entities as possible to have as much access to data as possible, and
any perception of a law enforcement agency being not legitimate may affect its access to data.
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Interorganizational Relationships
Given how important technology and data are to the formulation of an RTCC and that
much of the data is controlled by entities outside law enforcement organizations, it is essential to
understand the reason why agencies may decide to form an interorganizational relationship
(IOR) with these companies. IORs deal with the relationship between and among organizations.
IORs between law enforcement agencies and organizations can be vast. Law enforcement
agencies form IORs with businesses to provide goods and services that they need to function as
such. Popular goods and services include weapons, vehicles, technology, training, canines,
aviation and marine assets, and body armor. Law enforcement agencies also enter into IORs with
other law enforcement agencies. For example, a law enforcement agency may form an IOR with
a neighboring law enforcement agency that allows each to enter one another’s jurisdiction
without seeking prior approval. This is called mutual aid. Law enforcement agencies can also
form IORs to enhance their RTCCs.
For an RTCC to be effective at leveraging the vast amount of data in their possession in a
relatively short period and then combine the data with a multiple of sensor data, law enforcement
agencies need technology. One example of such technology includes programs law enforcement
agencies have created to allow private businesses to install cameras that are in turn monitored by
the RTCC. Private businesses provide video feeds to the RTCC, and these video feeds are
seamlessly integrated into the RTCC. In these scenarios, both entities reap benefits. The
businesses have their cameras monitored by a law enforcement agency, and the agency has
immediate access to video feeds should a crime occur within the cameras’ field of view.

14

Why a law enforcement agency chooses to enter into an IOR has been broken down into
six reasons. These reasons include necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and
legitimacy (Oliver, 1990). Oliver classifies these six reasons into two distinct categories: those
that are voluntary and those that are non-voluntary. The non-voluntary reason is termed necessity
and usually involves an organization being mandated by another such as a governmental
regulatory agency to enter an IOR (Oliver, 1990). The five other reasons, namely asymmetry,
reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy, focus on voluntary reasons as to why an
organization may enter an IOR.

Asymmetry
If an organizational enters an IOR for self-interest, it is doing so because of asymmetry
(Oliver, 1990). An organization’s desire to control and obtain scarce resources may cause it to try
to limit its competitors’ access to those resources, such as in the case of limited grant funds or
access to other federal programs (Brewer et al., 2007). Organizations may also attempt to acquire
knowledge limited to specialized law enforcement units. Popular examples include money
laundering expertise, sophisticated surveillance techniques, and wiretap experience. Once the
agency no longer participates in that IOR, this knowledge is transferred to the home agency
(Hayeslip & Russell-Einhorn et al., 2002). Asymmetry has been associated with resource
dependency theory.

Reciprocity
When entering an IOR based on reciprocity, organizations are doing so because the
relationship would be mutually beneficial to both because of common goals or interests (Oliver,
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1990). When asymmetry cannot explain why an organization entered an IOR, reciprocity can often
be used to explain the decision (Oliver, 1990).

Efficiency
Efficiency deals with internal, rather than external, reasons for engaging in an IOR and is
prompted by an organization’s attempt to improve processes that lead to a better input/output ratio
(Oliver, 1990). The need to be more efficient is based on internal workings and does not focus on
the control of resources, exerting power over another organization, or playing well with other
organizations (Oliver, 1990). If the costs associated with the IOR are too high or not worth
continuing, the organization can choose to continue obtaining that resource by moving the
production in-house or seeking it from another source at an acceptable price (Scott, 2014). Police
reform is often centered on improving efficiency in some aspects of organizational processes and
practices rather than making wholesale changes to how the police operates (Bullock, 2013).

Stability
When organizations experience uncertainty, they can choose to enter IORs to bring stability
and predictability to their situation (Oliver, 1990). When an organization enters an IOR to gain
stability, it is using coping strategies to “forestall, forecast, or absorb uncertainty” (Oliver, 1990,
p. 246) to bring order and certainty to resources (Benson, 1975). While not salient in the United
States, stability has been extensively researched in Central and South America. Studies indicate
that when political stability is high, law enforcement and the military have a favorable view of the
citizenry. Such favorable view decreases the need for law enforcement to partner with its military
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counterparts in anticipation of civil unrest (Sung et al., 2022). Stability has been associated with
resource dependency theory.

Legitimacy
Based on institutional theory, legitimacy attempts to explain IORs through a lens that
organizations wish to abide by a set rules or beliefs that have been established by partners
outside the organizations (Oliver, 1990). This outward search for validation of the organization
means that one organization may be seen as more legitimate than another. Hence, organizations
that form relationships partly due to legitimacy will often do so with an organization that appears
more legitimate than themselves (Oliver, 1990). Often, factors such as organizational age
influence the perceived legitimacy of an organization, and young organizations may partner with
established organizations to quickly establish legitimacy (Wiewel & Hunter, 1985).
While the reasons organizations establish IORs are not coupled with a specific theory, they
can be used as an enhancement to further explain organizational decisions. Many of the reasons
why organizations choose to enter an IOR are based on popular organizational theories.
Referencing these reasons along with the derived organizational theory serves to provide further
background to internal and external factors that might explain why organizations choose to engage
in certain behavior.

Institutional Theory
One such organizational theory and the closely associated concept of legitimacy is
institutional theory. Institutional theory helps explain the decision law enforcement agencies
make to establish an RTCC. This theory has been touted as one of the organizational theories
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that provides the best framework for explaining why law enforcement agencies structure
themselves the way they do and engage in the types of activities they do (Giblin & Burrus,
2008). While resource dependency theory and institutional theory are somewhat similar in that
outside forces play a powerful role in organizational change, institutional theorists hypothesize
two distinct lines where institutional theory applies to policing. The first line focuses on “myths”
and the institutional environment rather than the demands of work (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The
second one centers on why institutions change and become like other organizations; this
phenomenon is called institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).
To gain legitimacy, organizations must structure themselves and operate in a way that is
amenable to their stakeholders (Giblin & Burrus, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizations
require a wide variety of materials, resources, and technical information if they are going to
survive. Besides these material resources, organizations must be accepted and seen as creditable
to maintain success over a long period of time; in essence, they must be perceived as legitimate
(Scott, 2014). Suchman defined legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” Legitimacy is applied generally to an organization
rather than an event-specific evaluation and is “possessed objectively yet created subjectively”
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574).
This willingness to appease the stakeholders means the organizations’ primary goal is to
acquire legitimacy and operate in the most efficient way (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The
environment in which an organization operates can consist of individual institutional sectors that
can affect the organization (Meyer & Scott, 1983). These institutional sectors may comprise
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community leaders, elected officials, governmental regulators, accrediting bodies, and
professional unions (Matusiak, 2018).
Through repeated interactions, an organization can garner legitimacy with these
institutional sectors, and it eventually begins to become independent of the environment
(Aldrich, 1999; Donaldson, 2001; Maguire, 2014). The more the organizations become
independent of the environment, the more they are allowed to decide how to structure themselves
and what the best strategies are, even if it is only symbolic (Maguire, 2014). As a result of
legitimacy, organizations are under a tremendous amount of pressure to act in a certain way. The
act of appearing legitimate appears to be primary, and whether the pressure makes the agency
more efficient or effective seems secondary to appearing legitimate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
As agencies begin to act in a way that is expected of them, they begin to acquire
legitimacy, and the more legitimacy the organizations achieve, the less likely they are to have
their activities questioned (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Agencies need to be seen as legitimate
because this ensures a constant flow of resources necessary to perform their operations
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1988).
When an agency does not respond to institutional pressures calling for changes, it runs
the risk of losing legitimacy and potentially losing resources, which can ultimately lead to the
organization’s failure (King, 2000).
There are only a certain number of ways an agency can change to maintain its perceived.
Because of this constraint, similar organizations begin to look alike. DiMaggio and Powell called
this phenomenon “institutional isomorphism.” Isomorphism is a “constraining process that forces
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental
conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 149). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) describe three
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processes that lead to isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative processes. Organizations
undergo coercive isomorphism when forced to do so by another powerful organization, such as a
regulatory or administrative body (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The next source of isomorphism
is the mimetic process. When organizations copy what appears to be a successful process, they
engage in mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The final source that leads to
isomorphism is the normative process. As information, education, and training are disseminated
in a particular discipline through professional associations or training conferences, attendees will
return to their agencies and begin to implement what they have learned. This process of
implementing what has been learned in these settings is referred to as normative isomorphism
(Roy & Seguin, 2000).
Studies have revealed that there are institutional pressures on police agencies, and these
pressures can be responsible for a law enforcement agency moving in a specific direction.
Examples include the study by Katz et al. (2001) that showed that at least one police department
created a gang unit even though a gang problem did not exist in its jurisdiction. Willis et al.
(2007) found that strong institutional pressure to appear progressive and modern was the primary
factor for the adoption of COMPSTAT in the three law enforcement agencies studied. Further,
Carter (2016) revealed that strong institutional pressures following the September 11 terrorist
attacks played a significant role in police decisions to adopt ILP.
Institutional theory is important to this research because numerous studies have found
that there are institutional pressures on law enforcement agencies and that these pressures have
caused law enforcement agencies to adopt programs or policies when there was not any need or
necessity for them.
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The internal and external pressures described in institutional theory can be applied to a
law enforcement agency’s decision to establish an RTCC. Such pressures could, for instance,
come from elected officials, or city leaders, pressuring agencies to address a rising crime
problem. The agency may establish an RTCC not because it is the best solution that fits their
needs but because they are trying to gain legitimacy. Additionally, if a law enforcement agency
establishes an RTCC simply because a neighboring agency did the same, the institutional
external pressures of isomorphism could be used to explain this decision. By using institutional
theory in this study, it is believed that the theory can be applied to these sorts of internal and
external pressures that could cause a law enforcement agency to set up an RTCC in an attempt to
appear more legitimate.

Summary
In summary, the literature regarding a law enforcement agency’s decision to establish an RTCC is
lacking. On the surface, RTCCs seem to incorporate elements of reactive and proactive forms of
policing, yet these forms of proactive policing could not fully explain why law enforcement
agencies establish RTCCs. Adaptive theories of organizational change were also utilized to explain
whether internal or external pressures play a role in the agency’s decision-making process. By
employing the organizational theories discussed above, the researcher has the best opportunity to
examine what internal or external forces are influencing law enforcement agencies’ decisions to
implement RTCCs. Finally, these theories allow researchers to design studies and instruments that
capture whether these internal or external pressures are considered when an agency decides to
establish an RTCC.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND DATA
While organizational theories explaining organizational change and theoretical frameworks
explaining IORs are well-researched, the application to RTCCs is in the early stages. As such, this
study focuses on the reasons why Florida law enforcement agencies decided to establish RTCCs.
To do this, the study uses an exploratory research design that focuses on why Florida law
enforcement agencies are establishing RTCCs. Hopefully, this exploratory research will lead to
more research in the future.

Research Design
The overall study used a mixed methods design to examine an organization’s reason(s)
for or against creating or implementing an RTCC. The study was broken up into two different
studies (Study 1 & Study 2). The research design for Study 1 consisted of a content analysis of
newspaper articles. The research design for Study 2 included interviews utilizing open-ended
questions posed to Florida law enforcement agencies’ command staff with knowledge of why
their agency has or has not decided to establish an RTCC.
This methodology is appropriate for two reasons. First, research into why law enforcement
agencies are creating RTCCs is non-existent. A content analysis of newspaper articles will provide
a baseline for establishing what newspaper writers, the public, and law enforcement agency
administrators publicly express as important with respect to RTCCs. However, a content analysis
will not provide the critical information related to specific reasons as to why a law enforcement
agency has or has not created an RTCC. Structured interviews of Florida law enforcement
agencies’ command staff with knowledge of how the decision to create an RTCC was reached will
provide the most reliable information on agencies that have developed an RTCC. Commonalities
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and differences among the responses will allow the development of an overall explanatory
framework that can explain why this approach is spreading. Appropriate qualitative analyses will
be used for each type of data collected.

Study 1
For the newspaper content analysis portion of this study, inductive reasoning with
conventional content analysis, as outlined in Hsieh and Shannon (2005), is used. Inductive
reasoning using conventional analysis is appropriate because the data will allow the researcher to
develop the important themes contained in the articles. Conventional content analysis is
appropriate when the literature on a given subject is limited (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), and
researchers avoid using preconceived categories and allow the data to establish the coding
categories (Kondracki et al., 2002). For this study, the unit of analysis is words or phrases.
Process
Based on the work of Corbin and Strauss (2015) establishing sources of theoretical sensitivity, a
literature review of peer-reviewed articles on fusion centers was conducted. Several broad
categories emerged from these articles, augmented by the primary researcher’s professional
experience in working in and around fusion centers. These broad categories include the following:
•

Technology

•

Organization

•

Personnel

•

Structure

•

Marketing
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Once the broad categories were identified, a spreadsheet was created that contained
columns to capture whether any of these categories were observed in the articles.
This study used a purposive, non-probability sampling method to obtain news articles for
analysis. Purposive sampling is the most common sampling form used in content analysis and
ensures that the primary researcher obtains suitable informants that contain the best subjectmatter knowledge associated with the research topic (Kyngas et al., 2011).
To obtain the appropriate news articles, Nexis Uni was used to search for all newspaper
articles in the collection that contained the term “real-time crime center” or “real time crime
center”. Nexis Uni captures 21 publication types, so under the “Publication Type,” only
“Newspapers” were selected. This filter was the only filter used for the dataset. The total dataset
for Study 1 consisted of 235 news articles from all over the United States as well as international
newspapers. All results listed in the search are made part of the study’s content analysis dataset.
As articles were being read, specific themes within these broad categories were added to
the spreadsheet. If a column was inserted to the spreadsheet, then all the previously reviewed
articles were reviewed again to ascertain if the specific category for the new column was present
in any of the already reviewed articles. This process was continued until the entire dataset was
read once.
The articles were read a second time to determine general themes that were not captured
in the first reading. In the second reading, concepts that were not associated with the literature
review or professional experience were focused. If a concept or theme emerged that was not
developed from the literature review or professional experience, a column was added to the
spreadsheet. The column was distinguished in such a way as to notate that it was from the second
reading as opposed to the first. As already mentioned, if a column was added to the spreadsheet,
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then all previously reviewed articles were reviewed again to ensure that the concept associated
with the column is not present in previously reviewed articles.
Once all articles were reviewed a second time, the concepts or words entered in the
spreadsheet were reviewed to see if any of the concepts or themes could be condensed or
shortened into specific themes or phrases. Thereafter, a third reading was conducted to officially
code the articles using the codes created during the first two readings. The codes were entered in
the spreadsheet and marked as codes from the third reading. Coding was developed for the
existence of a concept and the frequency of a concept. Both terms are important as the existence
of a concept may be a reason for the creation of an RTCC, and the frequency of a concept may
signal to the researcher that a concept is an important aspect of RTCC and should be covered in
detail during the interviews.
Once all the coding had been completed, the results were entered into Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis, and the frequency for each code was obtained. After
obtaining the frequencies for each code, the results were used as a guide of important concepts
and themes during the interviews.

Initial data
From the first reading of the news articles, it became apparent that cameras are vital to an
RTCC as 105 of the 235 (45%) news articles mentioned cameras. Privacy concern was the second
most discussed item in the news articles (45 articles, 19%) mentioning privacy concerns associated
with RTCCs. Other notable topics included license plate readers (22 articles, 9%), ShotSpotter
technology (20 articles, 8%), and facial recognition technology (14 articles, 5%).
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Analysis
From the second reading, three concepts emerged. The first is that RTCCs facilitate law
enforcement agencies transitioning from a strictly reactive model of policing to a sort of
enhancement of reactive policing. An enhancement to a reactive form of policing is appropriate as
opposed to calling it proactive policing because the crime is already afoot, and law enforcement is
using technology to detect it at much higher rates than manually. With the speed and efficiency an
RTCC can process data and catch crime as it occurs, a new model of policing might need to be
created. Such a model needs to bridge the gap between having citizens determine when to involve
the police and preventing crime before it occurs; a model that is created based on the newfound
efficiency with which law enforcement can now operate.
A new model might be necessary because this “catch and investigate crime as it occurs”
model does not fit the reactive and proactive model of policing. Reactive policing involves three
main functions of law enforcement: routine patrol, immediate response to calls, and follow-up
investigations (Cordner & Sheehan, 1999). RTCCs appear to enhance reactive policing by
generating the calls themselves based on the license plate reader (LPR) hits for stolen vehicles,
informing patrol officers of ShotSpotter notifications, and using cameras to solve crimes that in
the past would not have been possible. This concept does not fit the reactive model of policing
because in reactive policing, the public decides whether to involve the police, and the RTCC
keeps the involvement of the police within the police agency itself, much like in the proactive
model (Waddington, 1993).
Proactive policing can be defined as “all policing strategies that have as one of their goals
the prevention or reduction of crime and disorder and that are not reactive in terms of focusing
primarily on uncovering ongoing crime or on investigating or responding to crimes once they
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have occurred” (National Academy of Sciences, 2018, pp. 1, 30). RTCCs do have a proactive
component, namely CCTV cameras. However, the concept of law enforcement agencies using
CCTV cameras is not a novel one. The novel concept appears to be the use of technology and
staff to monitor the cameras and marry the camera feeds with police calls for service along with
other law enforcement databases RTCC employees have access to. Once RTCCs are made aware
of a crime, it is no longer a proactive incident; the crime has already been committed, so the
proactive model of policing no longer applies.
RTCCs seem to facilitate this new model of policing but also allow law enforcement
agencies the flexibility to provide a vast amount of intelligence, including surveillance camera
footages, to investigators within a short time frame. This analytical component to RTCCs is
highlighted in the content analysis as eight articles discussed the organization of the agency’s
RTCC. In all cases mentioned, the RTCC was in the agencies’ intelligence unit. Placing the
RTCC within the Intelligence Bureau means that some level of intelligence analysis is taking
place and the agencies that have established an RTCC are now dependent on a crime intelligence
analyst. However, the content analysis revealed that sworn (both officers and detectives) and
non-sworn personnel can be assigned to an RTCC. This organizational change or reorganization
to accommodate a structural change aligns with idea that an organization will seek to attain fit.
The idea that agencies will seek to obtain fit is a central tenet of contingency theory.
The second concept is that RTCCs require a tremendous amount of electronic equipment
and software. Numerous articles discuss having data warehouses and specialized software
capable of searching, retrieving, and disseminating large volumes of data to investigators in the
field. As agencies determine they are no longer in fit with the technology requirements they need
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to properly support the RTCC, they may consider upgrading the technology that supports the
RTCC. This idea of regaining fit is associated with contingency theory.
Agencies that establish RTCCs will need to rely on outside software vendors to supply,
maintain, and update the necessary software and computer hardware necessary to support the
technological backbone present in an RTCC. Given the rate at which agencies are establishing
RTCCs, it does not appear that the technological resources required to establish an RTCC
constitute a factor. However, how these agencies dealt with these issues does warrant
examination for agencies that could be considering an RTCC.
The final concept emerging from the second reading is that RTCCs act as a force
multiplier for law enforcement agencies that have many vacancies. For this study, the term
“force multiplier” will be used in the context where RTCCs may substitute or augment for a lack
of sworn officers. Three articles discussed the need to address department-wide vacancies and
RTCCs appear to offer a solution that allows law enforcement administrators to fill in gaps in
departmental staff. As agencies face an increase in crime, leading to extended wait times for an
officer to respond, they may begin to experience external pressures from a variety of sources.
The use of an RTCC as a force multiplier to appease the entities exerting the external pressure
can be associated with institutional theory.
While not specifically noted in these three concepts, resource dependency theory was
observed during the content analysis. At least one city devised a program that formed a
partnership between private businesses and the RTCC. In this program, private businesses
purchased a surveillance camera compatible with the RTCC’s camera system. The business paid
for the camera and its installation, while the RTCC paid for the video storage. The business had
their video camera monitored 24 hours a day by the RTCC, and the RTCC had instantaneous
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access to the stored camera video footages in case crimes occurred near the cameras. This
public–private partnership where both parties obtain benefits represents a central tenet of
resource dependency theory and the tenant of reciprocity and efficiency of Oliver (1990). The
program was so successful that at least one article discussed the possible expansion of the
program to residences located in high-crime areas.
The results of Study 1 indicate that organizational aspects, electronic equipment, and
staffing issues were salient regarding the development of RTCCs. To further explore these aspects,
specific questions were tailored to discuss the points identified in Study 1. The organizational
aspect was explored with questions that served to ascertain the agencies’ intelligence structure and
current capabilities. Questions were also formulated to investigate how the organizational structure
changed because of establishing an RTCC. Technology issues were examined within the context
of funding with several questions devoted to grants. Grant questions included whether grants were
used, who wrote them, and whether the agency partnered with academic institutions. Finally,
staffing issues were addressed through questions eliciting information on who was assigned to
work in RTCCs and the allocation of resources to the various units within the law enforcement
agencies. These points along with their corresponding questions were examined in Study 2 via the
adaptive theories of organizational changes presented in this thesis.

Study 2
In qualitative research, data practices and collection procedures are the main factors that
influence the quality and trustworthiness of a research project, with interviews being the most
used form of data collection (Kitto et al., 2008; Taylor, 2008). Within the subset of interviews,
semi-structured interviews are the most used interview technique in qualitative research
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(DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Semi-structured interviews have been described as in-depth
interviews that allow respondents to answer formulated open-ended questions that are answered
conversationally and often accompanied by follow-up questions involving why or how (Adams
2015; Jamshed, 2014). The format of the semi-structured interview gives the researcher the
flexibility to navigate through the topics on the survey questionnaire and delve into totally
unforeseen issues, unlike a standardized survey that requires strict adherence to the questionnaire
(Adams, 2015).
The semi-structured interview format is well-suited for several purposes including
interviews that require follow-up questions, probing open-ended questions that allow the
researcher to learn about the independent thoughts of each interviewee, or when a researcher
ventures into uncharted territory and requires freedom to spot emerging trends and wishes to
pursue them (Adams, 2015). Individuals who are well-suited for semi-structured interviews
include administrators, front-line staff, top administrators, or board members (Adams, 2015).
The semi-structured interview format is appropriate for this study because the study purpose is to
scrutinize law enforcement agency administrators’ perceptions of or opinions on a complex issue,
and semi-structured interviews allow participants to express diverse perceptions of a particular
topic (Barriball & While, 1994; Cridland et al., 2015).
Process:
For Study 2 Florida law enforcement agencies that had established RTCCs were readily
available through internet searches. Additionally, through law enforcement associations, a list of
Florida law enforcement agencies that had established RTCCs were identified. To minimize the
non-response rates, a personalized letter introducing the primary investigators was included in
the packet. The letters were personalized for each recipient, contained blue ink signatures, and
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presented on high-quality paper. The letter requested an appointment for an interview of
approximately one hour with the sheriff or police chief, or an individual with knowledge
regarding their agency’s decision to create an RTCC. The letter explained the purpose for
conducting the research study, namely to explore the reasons why Florida law enforcement
agencies have or have not established RTCCs. The letter asked for their help in conducting the
study and notified them that their responses to the questionnaires will be confidential.
For this study the semi-structured interview guide formulated by Kallio et al. (2016) was
utilized. The interview guide consisted of five phases that included (1) identifying the need for
using semi-structured interviews; (2) retrieving and using existing knowledge; (3) formulating a
preliminary interview guide; (4) testing the guide; and (5) presenting the completed guide (Kallio
et. al., 2016).
Instrument:
For this study, phase 1 and phase 2 had already been completed, so the guide begun with
phase 3. The interview instrument used key points
developed in Study 1, key points associated with each organizational theory and the
primary investigators knowledge of RTCCs collected or observed through experiences in the law
enforcement community. The instrument consists of 18 questions, with several questions
containing multiple parts and follow-up questions.
For phase 4, the primary researcher conducted a mock interview of a law enforcement
official who was familiar with RTCCs, but whose agency did not have an RTCC. This agency
was also not one of the Sheriff’s Offices that did not have a RTCC but was provided a packet.
Questions were reviewed to make sure the target of the study stayed at the organizational level
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and no identifying information was collected that would identify study participants. The
instrument is attached as Appendix B.
For phase 5, the instrument would be provided to potential agencies with the introductory
letter, so agency administrators could review the questions beforehand and decide whether there
were sensitive questions they did not feel comfortable answering. The packets advised
participants of the goals and objectives of the study in accordance with the guidelines set by the
University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB). A copy of the UCF-IRB
approval letter is listed in Appendix C.
In total 53 packets were mailed to various Florida law enforcement agencies. The
agencies that currently have RTCCs consisted of 18 sheriff’s offices, 11 police departments and
1 University Police Department. To research the possibility of why certain sheriff’s offices had
not established RTCCs, the 2020 census data regarding county population data were collected
from the United States Census website. The population of each of Florida’s 67 counties was
obtained and the county with the lowest population that currently had an RTCC was determined.
That county is currently Flagler County with a population of 115,378. Flagler County
established the minimum county population for including a sheriff’s office that currently did not
have an RTCC.
The counties were then sorted from most populous to least populous and the 20 counties
with the highest populations that currently do not have an RTCC were included in the list to
receive packets. All the sheriff’s offices that received packets and that currently do not have an
RTCC had higher county populations than Flagler County. Since a major Florida university
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partnered with other law enforcement agencies in the creation of an RTCC, 3 large state
universities with police departments also received packets.
To collect as much data as possible, 30 days after the first packet was mailed, a second
packet was mailed to the 17 agencies that currently have RTCCs but did not respond to the
original mailing. The second mailing contained many of the same components as the first
mailing, but the personalized letter was different. The personalized letter in the second mailing
listed the number of agencies that had already agreed to participate in the study and emphasized
the researchers desire to obtain as much data as possible. See Table 2 in Appendix A for a
breakdown of the types of law enforcement agency that were sent an instrument, whether the law
enforcement agency had an RTCC and the agency’s response rate.
Population and Sample:
The subjects of this study represent those law enforcement agencies that responded to the
mailed packets and agreed to participate in an interview or completed the instrument and
returned it to the primary investigator. After the first mailing, 20 of the 53 agencies that were
sent a letter responded, representing a response rate of 37%. Of these 20 agencies, one agency
advised they would not participate in the study and 7 agencies advised they would participate in
the study but failed to schedule an interview. The remaining 12 agencies provided data for this
study. Ten agencies chose to participate in an interview and 2 agencies chose not to participate
in an interview but completed the instrument and provided the results to the primary investigator.
Of the 12 agencies that provided data, 10 currently have RTCCs and two do not. The 12 agencies
consisted of 8 sheriff’s offices and 4 police departments.
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After the second mailing, 1 additional sheriff’s office responded. This sheriff’s office
had an RTCC and chose to provide data by completing the instrument and returning it to the
primary researcher. This brought the final total number of agencies that provided data for this
study to 13.
Analysis of Data:
A content analysis of the data collected during the interviews was conducted and 9
interviews were recorded and transcribed. One agency that participated in an interview
requested that the interview not be recorded. For this interview, the primary researcher took
notes and typed key responses in a document. For the three agencies that provided data via the
instrument form, the entire form was loaded into the analysis software. The content analysis was
conducted on Nvivo version 12.

Findings
The purpose of this study was to conduct an exploratory analysis to see if Florida law
enforcement agencies are creating RTCCs to respond to and investigate crime in “real time.”
Additionally, the following questions were asked: Did external factors (e.g., elected officials,
clergy, judges, community leaders, etc.) play a role in the Florida law enforcement agencies’
decision to establish an RTCC? Did internal factors play a role in the Florida law enforcement
agencies’ decision to establish an RTCC? Do RTCCs stand alone or do they interact with other
organizations?
The answers provided by respondents during the interviews are categorized and
summarized as follows:
Question 1: Is your agency an intelligence-led policing agency?
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Nine of the 13 agencies (69%) stated their agency was an intelligence-led policing
agency. Many of the respondents mentioned having weekly intelligence-sharing meetings where
analysts would brief agency command staff on crime trends, including hotspots and crimes rates.
A central theme was the use of data to determine the deployment of resources. One respondent
indicated as follows:
Yes, when I came into office, that was one of my goals, to use an intelligence-led
policing approach. And we’ve used the Omega Dashboard for several years to help us
visualize our data on crime, and every Monday at our command staff meeting, we have
the operational division commanders stay after command staff, and we go through what
our crime issues are from the week before. We look at, you know, the number of calls for
service, number of burglaries, where we’re felons have registered, domestic violence
calls, just basically a whole a lot of data. It’s probably a thirty-something page report that
we go through. We’ve got our county broken down, of course, into zones, but we also
create an east and west district. So that’s kind of how we look at our data.
One agency also described how it creates intelligence bulletins of suspects and suspects’
vehicles, which are passed on directly to patrol and allow patrol officers to prioritize their time
during their shift. One respondent said the following:
When I got hired here in 2004, I was the very first analyst that was hired. So, when I
started, I had to build everything. So, we had an intel function, but we didn’t have an
analytical function. So, from there, fast forward to today, you know, we do products daily
that patrol uses to make their plans for the day, the week, the month, whatever.
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The three agencies that reported they were not intelligence-led policing agencies seemed
to strictly abide by the academic definition of intelligence-led policing. One agency relayed that
the answer to this question was yes and no. The respondent mentioned as follows:
We follow parts of intelligence-led policing, but not all of them. We do work proactively
to identify those offenders that are causing the most crime. Once those offenders are
identified, we work with our proactive units to target them. However, we don’t focus on
the criminal organizations that are committing crime, and for that reason, I would say that
we are not an intelligence-led policing agency.
Another respondent said the following:
I think we utilize some components of intelligence-led policing. I think we’re probably
more accurately defined as a problem-orientated, problem-solving agency. I would say
the strategy that we articulate to our body is what we refer to as precision policing. You
know, it’s, I don’t know if it’s necessarily as mainstream as some of the other ones. It’s
not uncommon, though. It’s kind of was more of a stolen strategy from New York, where
we really tried to focus on chronic offenders. So, like intelligence-led policing, we’re
looking at data that implies what is going to be reoccurring problems, reoccurring people,
reoccurring issues, and kind of just zero in and focusing on problem-solving those issues.
Question 6: Was the primary reason the RTCC was established a criminal event?
One law enforcement agency that does not have an RTCC but does have a center like an
RTCC created its crime fighting center to deal with a crime hotspot. The high-crime area
covered a three-square-mile area near a major state university. The center became so
successful that the law enforcement agency decided to expand camera coverage, and it
now has several hundred cameras in-high crime areas. As the center grew and expanded,
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it integrated additional technology, such as LPRs. The law enforcement agency does not
consider their crime fighting center to be an RTCC because employees of the center do
not assist with crimes in progress. The employees simply react to crimes the technology
detects, and the employees alert the appropriate patrol officers.
Question 7: If the primary reason for the creation of the RTCC was something other than
a criminal event, could you explain what was the reason?
Of the 11 agencies that responded that currently have an RTCC, 9 (81%) indicated that
the availability of technology was a primary driver of the agency’s decision to establish the
RTCC. The level of technology that was discussed varied between agencies; at a basic level, it
appeared to be availability of cameras and LPRs all the way to advanced technology that tied
these technologies together with calls the departments had received. These advance forms of
technology meant that the computer programs graphically displayed the location of cameras and
license plate readers on a map and often prominently showed the relevant camera feed for the
call the RTCC was working. This meant that the RTCC was able to operate much more
efficiently despite having access to hundreds of cameras and large volumes of data. One
respondent stated as follows:
But the reason why I believe it started is not because of an event, but because of
technology, because everything seemed to be pushing that way. You know, the
involvement of cameras and the ability to bring in cameras along with ShotSpotter or
LPR, those systems just working together now, even though we don’t really get into
NIBIN been up here, that’s more with the crime analysis unit but because of the
technology can link cases.
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Mention was also made of a specific incident and the respondent began looking for
technology to ensure that a similar incident would not occur within the agency’s jurisdiction,
specifically reported as follows:
There was an event that was a Miami kidnapping of a kid. And the person fled the Miami
area in a white van, and the white van was discovered in the county north of me in Pasco
County. It amazed me, annoyed me. I couldn’t believe that. A van could get all the way
from South Florida up to Pasco County when all these Amber Alerts were all going all
over the place and stuff. Then we didn’t have one LPR hit or anything like that where we
could have used it to kind of track the movements. So, I kind of looked at the technology
that was available, and some of the technology that we had already gave us access to
traffic cameras, and there was already red light cameras that have a component of
catching tags.
The cost of the technology becoming cheaper was also listed as a reason why at least one
agency created an RTCC. The respondent stated the following:
Well, I’ve seen it, you know, successfully employed in other areas, in a primarily larger
areas with more resources, where I would consider us a mid-size community. And this
kind of, I’ll be honest with you, the impetus of it is really technology disruptors in the
industry that have come in and made it affordable for agencies our size.
The final reason given for the creation of an RTCC was mimetic isomorphism. A city
police department had an RTCC, and the sheriff felt that it would not look well for a sheriff’s
office to not have an RTCC when a smaller police department already had one. The sheriff’s
office established an RTCC, but it was not supported. It was not until a new sheriff was elected
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that the RTCC received the support of the agency’s administration. The city later closed their
RTCC and partnered with the sheriff’s office.
Question 8: What are the primary functions of the RTCC?
All agencies with an RTCC that responded provided generally the same answer regarding
the primary functions of their RTCC. That primary function involves providing situational
awareness in real time to officers responding to a crime in progress. One respondent stated as
follows:
The real-time crime center (RTCC) vets calls for service to provide situational awareness
and enhance officer safety, as well as processes investigative requests for homicides,
robberies, shootings, and other critical event cases. The RTCC functions as a centralized
data hub that rapidly mines information across multiple criminal, civil, and social media
sources. The coordination and distribution of real-time information is supplied to police
officers and detectives to provide situational awareness and ensure a more effective and
timely response to criminal activity and subject apprehension while enhancing officer
safety. Additionally, the RTCC is responsible for the immediate dissemination of
ShotSpotter alerts. Once an alert is received, road officers are immediately advised of the
location of the shots fired as well as the number of rounds that were fired.
Even though all agencies responded that the primary function of their RTCC is to provide
information to responding officers, when the RTCC analysts close their call will depend on the
agency.
At least 6 out of 13 agencies (46%) reported that when the call no longer deals with
situations in real time, it is closed, and the intelligence developed during the call is packaged and
sent to the crime analysis section. Three agencies out of 13 (23%) indicated that the analyst
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could continue data mining for information regarding that call from previous calls if there were
no pending calls. One agency stated that the line between the RTCC and the crime analysis
section is blurry. Within this agency, often RTCC analysts will be allowed to continue to work
on closed calls, but it depends on the type of case and their current workload. The decision for
an RTCC analyst to continue working on cases no longer considered to be in real time is made
by the agency’s intelligence manager, who supervises the crime analysis section and RTCC.
Several agencies mentioned that the support provided to the responding officer often depended
on the experience of the RTCC analyst. One respondent described this interaction as follows:
You get a call, review it, evaluate it, use your skills, your training and your experience to
identify what’s available that could support or help. Sometimes it’s simply, as you heard,
the officer’s request; if they can get them a photo quickly of a particular person or
something, they’ll respond on the radio and have dialogue back and forth with the
officers. Sure. You’re going to get to the issues of the concerns or some of the problems
that come up that will come back to that, but there is a dialogue between the real-time
center and the officers in the field and pretty much a healthy thing for the most part.
For many of the agencies, this interaction between the RTCC and the responding officers
will involve civilian analysts. Eight out of 13 agencies (61%) indicated that all employees that
work in the RTCC are non-sworn analysts. This heavy emphasis on civilian analysts has created
unique training opportunities for the analysts. Several agencies reported that they require the
analyst to participate in police ride-alongs, attend training with the patrol officers, and even
attend parts of the orientation for new officers. All this training is geared toward having the
analyst think like an officer when they assist with a call and anticipate what the officer will need
during that call and, more importantly, what that officer does not need to hear during the call.
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The role of the analyst turned out to be pivotal to providing information to responding
officers, yet in larger agencies, sworn law enforcement officers played a vital role in providing
situation awareness to responding officers. One large police department used senior detectives in
addition to analysts in its RTCC. The detectives operated the camera system, were responsible
for communicating scene intelligence to responding officers, maintained and preserved video
evidence, and proactively used the RTCC cameras to identify crimes in progress. The agency’s
representative acknowledged that most agencies that visited the RTCC were originally hesitant to
remove detectives from case work, but once the visitors saw how the agency uses detectives in
the RTCC, they were impressed at what the detectives from the RTCC could accomplish.
Question 9: How has the RTCC changed the way your agency operates?
Eight of the 11 agencies (72%) that established an RTCC indicated that the RTCC has
made the police department more efficient, enabled the department to solve crime that would not
have been solved before, increased officer safety, and made the public and suspects safer. One
respondent stated as follows:
I think it’s just made us more efficient in our response. For the most part. I think there’s a
greater awareness of the officer in the field of what data is available to them, which I
think makes them more efficient in their ability to close a case. I think it makes us safer
in our ability to respond and not go in blindly. I certainly have visions of doing more with
it.
Several agencies spoke about crimes that would not have been solved prior to the
establishment of the RTCC. One respondent indicated the following:
So the technology that we have, we just had a shooting that came in, the camera’s
kicked off in that area, the analysts were able to see the suspect vehicle that was shooting.
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They were able to see the targets who ran away. And it was not late at night, but it was at
night. There was no one else on the street except for this one woman who was in between
the shooter and the people they were shooting at. And she dove under a dumpster, so
when the analysts saw that before the officers arriving, they’re already telling the officers
they’re giving that overview of, hey, you may have somebody who’s shot. Well, she gets
up, she walks into a store across the street. The officers still have not arrived.
Everybody’s gone. That would have been a note in the log. But because of the
ShotSpotter, and because of the real-time crime center, they were able to give a direction
of vehicle description of the suspects. They track back with their cameras to where the
suspects are. The victims had run to their car, and they drove off. They drove 15 minutes
down the road and parked right under one of our other cameras, and the officers were
able to be directed right to where they were. We were able to identify them as the victims
in the shooting. The officers at the scene, were told that the woman had walked into the
store. They pulled her out and just brought her out to the corner and went, “Is this her?”
And the real-time crime center analyst was like, “Yep, that’s her.” So now because of the
RTCC, we have suspects, we have witnesses, we have victims. The whole incident is on
camera where a case is opened and closed, where it never would have been.
Finally, several agencies spoke about an increase in officer and public safety. One
respondent narrated an incident where a deputy made a traffic stop, shortly after which, she
communicated via radio that the suspect had attempted to grab her weapon. The RTCC was able
to access the deputy’s body-worn camera and could check on the status of the deputy. Several
back-up deputies responded to the deputy’s location at high speed with their lights and sirens on,
many coming from several miles away. The RTCC was able to tell the responding deputies that
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the situation was under control as the deputy was able to deploy her taser and place the subject
under arrest. Using the video feed from the deputy’s body-worn camera, the RTCC was able to
confidently tell responding deputies that the situation was under control and an emergency
response at high-speed rate was no longer needed. The respondent indicated that prior to the
establishment of the RTCC, a coordinated response that kept the deputy and the public safe
would not have been possible.
Question 10: What benefits have you seen because of the establishment of an RTCC?
Many of the respondents reiterated their answers to the previous question and discussed
how the RTCC has fundamentally changed the way their agency operates. One respondent
mentioned the following:
So obviously, the benefit of being able to identify those suspects and get those suspects in
custody. We had another incident where a guy was followed home from a bank and was
murdered in his driveway. We were able to pick up with the LPR camera our victim, and
right behind our victim is the suspect. Without that, we’re never arresting that guy. How
are we ever going to identify that guy? We know it’s such a random thing. You’re not
getting that, so the real-time crime center and the assets that feed in there have certainly
been beneficial in solving some very significant high-profile crimes.
Another benefit that one agency reported was having analysts from multiple police
departments working together in the RTCC. The respondent stated as follows:
You know, when you see multiple units within the agency working together, you know,
or especially multiple agencies, you know, and that’s probably been one of the biggest
benefits to this crime center is with everyone’s information coming through one hub. You
know, now when we take a report in a city for a given crime and that has M.O. ties to
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crimes that were committed in other parts of the county, well, we’re all at the crime
center. We get all those bulletins; we get all that information at one spot.
Question 11: What are some negative aspects of establishing an RTCC?
All 13 agencies that responded indicated the cost associated with instituting and
maintaining an RTCC is the biggest negative. Agencies reported that the software used to
aggregate disparate sources of information can cost over half a million dollars. Additionally,
each camera and LPR system can cost tens of thousands of dollars to install and maintain.
Finally, there are licensing fees for almost every database used in the RTCC. This means that
selecting a product that does not work as intended or does not do as was promised means large
sums of money are wasted. Several agencies discussed the pressure of ensuring that these sorts of
mistakes do not happen multiple times.
Another negative aspect of establishing an RTCC is staffing. Two agencies indicated that
having all the technology in the world is nice, but if agencies do not have qualified, competent
analysts to utilize the databases and provide meaningful results, then the technology is essentially
useless. In addition, analysts employed in an RTCC must be comfortable working under pressure
to deliver accurate information, often within a few minutes. Often, analysts cannot adjust to the
demands of working in an RTCC and are either dismissed or transferred out of the unit. This can
be a significant loss to the agency that has invested time and resources training that analyst.
Question 13: Who in your agency was the primary person/role responsible for the
implementation of the RTCC?
Seven of the 13 agencies (53%) that responded reported that it was someone other than
the sheriff or police chief who was responsible for the implementation their RTCC. In almost all
these cases, the individual was in a sworn position, often in middle management in the law
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enforcement agency. These seven individuals were described as visionaries, always keeping up
with the latest innovations in law enforcement or recognizing the value of technology.
In the four cases where the sheriff or police chief was identified as the person responsible
for the implementation of the RTCC, the sheriff or police chief learned of the concept of RTCC
from an outside entity. In two cases, the sheriff or police chief learned what an RTCC is through
a professional association. In one instance, a sheriff learned about RTCC from a software
vendor, and in another instance, a sheriff established an RTCC because a local police department
already had one. In two of these cases, similar wording was used to describe the sheriff or police
chief, mainly that they liked keeping up with the latest trends in law enforcement or were
visionaries.
Question 14: Describe the time frame from the conception to the implementation of the
RTCC.
All the agencies that responded indicated that it took 6–12 months to open their RTCC.
None of the agencies reported that the opening of their RTCC was due to external factors; it was
rather due to internal factors. Equipment validation and testing were frequently listed as the main
reasons for delays. Another frequently listed delay was the need to establish policies and
procedures on how the RTCC would function and ensuring that the RTCC complied with federal
and state laws concerning data privacy. Finally, two agencies mentioned that they decided to
conduct a beta test to assess the feasibility of an RTCC and that analyzing the results of the test
led to delays in the implementation by several months.
Question 15: How is the RTCC primarily funded?
All the agencies informed that grant funds were used to establish their RTCCs.
Commonly listed grants included the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant and the
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Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant. Most agencies, regardless of size, had a
person at the agency designated to write and manage grants, with the largest agencies in the
sample having employees that exclusively worked on grants. None of the agencies reported that
they had partnered with local colleges or universities to obtain grants. Furthermore, none
indicated that its RTCC was established because of the availability of grants. Finally, another
popular funding source appeared to be funds obtained through asset forfeiture. Four agencies
relayed that asset forfeiture funds were used to establish the agency’s RTCC.
Question 16: Were community organizations’ or leaders’ input sought before the
implementation of the RTCC?
None of the agencies that responded indicated that community organizations’ or leaders’
input was sought before the implementation of the RTCC. However, four of the agencies stated
that advisory boards or community groups were given tours of their RTCC. One respondent
mentioned as follows:
Well, so far, we’ve had many community groups come in, and about three weeks ago, our
chaplain said, “Hey, I got a group coming in as civilians. They’re going to be very
vocal.” And I’m like, “Oh,” he goes, “Yeah.” He goes, “You know, most of the
community groups are very good, but these guys you’ll recognize; they’re all pastors;
they’re very vocal in the community. They’ve never seen the real-time crime center, but
they’re very critical of the sheriff. But I want them to see the real-time crime center to
show them what we’re doing.” I’m like, “Okay, yeah, no problem.” And they came in,
and they were the best group ever. They asked challenging questions, but they were like,
“Well, looking at this, you need more cameras.”
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This trend of support emerged throughout many of the interviews and seemed to focus on
using technology to produce results. Many of the respondents indicated that they are very happy
to show the technology used in their RTCC to community leaders to answer any privacy
questions the community may have. One respondent indicated as follows:
I’m very cognizant of privacy issues. And that’s you know, that’s also the difference
being the sheriff is that I can make those decisions to employ that kind of stuff, but I’m
responsible to the people that I work for, you know, and if they don’t like it and, you
know, for years I could be in trouble. When we started out, I brought all the county
commissioners in, the school superintendents, some community leaders when we started
dipping our feet and the license plate readers, we did some media outreach with that,
shared some success stories, you know, told people how it worked. And I’ve had
numerous success stories, and I’m so excited about it. I’ve enjoyed showing it off. I invite
people all the time, you know, “Hey, come by and see the crime center,” and many have
seen it. You know, my concern about the people being concerned that capability hasn’t
been there, and I have not had any pushback. They’ve all been very supportive of it and
appreciative of the fact that we’re using technology to keep them safe.
Question 17: Have other agencies contacted you regarding the implementation of an
RTCC?
Eight of the 11 agencies with an RTCC that responded said they had been contacted by
other agencies regarding the implementation of an RTCC. Of these eight, one agency reported
that several international agencies had contacted them regarding their RTCC.

47

Summary
In summary, this study consisted of two distinct parts (Study 1 and Study 2). Study 1
suggested that contingency theory and resource dependency theory may be able to explain an
agency’s decision to establish an RTCC. Additionally, Study 1 indicated that RTCCs might be
responsible for a shift in the policing model from a strictly reactive form to an enhanced reactive
one that uses technology to make agencies more efficient. Study 1 also highlighted the
importance technology plays in RTCCs and that this technology may be used to ease officer
shortages that many agencies are experiencing.
Study 2 revealed that external factors may not be a major consideration for an agency when
deciding to establish an RTCC. Furthermore, internal factors often discussed in the criminal justice
literature, while present in some of the respondent’s answers, may not fully explain why Florida
law enforcement agencies are choosing to establish an RTCC. While Study 1 and Study 2 were
able to partially explain why agencies are establishing RTCCs, further discussion is needed to
delve deeper into the reasons why Florida law enforcement agencies are establishing RTCCs.
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION
The present study was conducted to examine the primary factors Florida law enforcement
agencies used when deciding whether, or not, to establish an RTCC. However, before initiating
any sort of discussion regarding the results of the study, it is important to define exactly what an
RTCC is. Despite RTCCs having been in existence for over ten years, the author could not find
an operational definition for an RTCC in the academic literature.
While the capabilities of RTCCs can vary widely based on agencies’ budgets, personnel,
and capabilities, several key features of RTCCs emerged from the data. Across the agencies, the
features included the ability to data mine a wide variety of databases and then provide this data
to law enforcement officers actively investigating or responding to a crime. The provided data is
meant to increase the law enforcement officers’ overall effectiveness while ensuring increased
officer safety. Therefore, an RTCC can be operationally defined as “a unit within a police
department that vets calls for service relating to crimes in progress or crimes currently being
investigated and uses a centralized data hub in order to provide an effective response, increased
situational awareness and enhanced officer safety.” How agencies choose to define each
component of this definition is up to them, and the results can vary greatly based on a multitude
of contingencies.
Now that an RTCC has been defined, the relationship between the decision to establish
an RTCC and the various organizational theories can be explored. Study 1 is significant because
it looks at RTCCs from a perspective outside the law enforcement agency. From this perspective,
external factors associated with contingency and resource dependency theory seem to be what
many articles discuss. Study 2 is important because it looks at RTCCs from a perspective within
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the law enforcement agency and focuses on Florida law enforcement agencies. The interviews
also allow the primary researcher to focus on key concepts and themes linked to the various
adaptive organizational theories. Major themes that will be discussed in Study 2 include using an
RTCC to supplement for a lack of patrol officers and law enforcement’s reliance on technology.
These themes will be examined through the lens of an “institutional entrepreneur.”
One of the findings from this study is that some law enforcement agencies have fallen out
of fit due to their inability to attract and retain officers. Multiple articles reported law
enforcement agencies establishing RTCCs to ease the burden of lacking patrol officers
(Callaghan, 2019; Hefferman, 2021). This concept was investigated in Study 2 and was found
not to be the reason why Florida law enforcement agencies are establishing RTCCs. There was a
significant amount of discussion during the interviews that patrol is the most important part of
the law enforcement agency and resources would be taken or diverted from specialty units to
ensure patrol has adequate resources to be successful.
Another concept that emerged was the heavy reliance on technology in the operation of
RTCCs. Technology was a central concept in both studies. In Study 1, vast amounts of
technologies were discussed as being part of an RTCC. There were discussions of data
warehouses, specialized software, facial recognition programs, and camera networks that often
amounted to the hundreds or thousands. The size and scope left the impression that technology
was a constraining variable and prevented almost all law enforcement agencies, except the
largest, from establishing an RTCC. The focus on specialized technology placed heavy emphasis
on resource dependency theory to obtain the necessary technology needed to operate an RTCC.
Study 2 shed a completely different light on the technology aspect. Technology was
relevant in Study 2 but was discussed in a different way. While some of the larger agencies
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reported having data warehouses and sophisticated software programs, many of the agencies
discussed technology to make officers in the field more efficient. Efficiency and officer safety
were commonly listed as benefits of RTCCs and how the RTCC changed the law enforcement
agency. Both aspects were accomplished through technology.
For some agencies, technology did not have to be complex or sophisticated. Many
agencies operated their RTCC with standard law enforcement equipment such as radios and
monitor calls and standard law enforcement databases available to all law enforcement agencies.
At least one medium-sized agency indicated that if it were not for the significant price decrease
associated with cameras and LPRs, the widespread use of such technology would not be
financially feasible. This suggests that transaction cost theory has played a role in the
establishment of an RTCC for at least one agency. This agency also stated that much of the
software it used was developed in-house by an employee who was very familiar with computer
coding. This agency was able to leverage different non-traditional options for increasing the
technology available in its RTCC. Many respondents expressed a strong desire for more cameras
or license plate readers because they can beneficial but indicated that money is always a limiting
factor to how quickly technology can be purchased and implemented.
While technology is important and beneficial in the operation of RTCCs, several RTCCs
operated with limited technology or found ways to provide services without specialized software.
This indicates that at least one of the primary reasons why Florida law enforcement agencies are
creating RTCCs is to assist law enforcement officers to respond to and investigate crimes in real
time. Technology enhances how RTCCs assist these officers, but some level of response and
assistance can be achieved regardless of the amount of technology available in the RTCCs.
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The final finding from Study 1 was that a new model of policing may need to be created
instead of relying on the reactive and proactive model. During Study 2, all the respondents were
asked if their RTCCs were reactive or proactive in nature. Universally, all respondents
mentioned that their RTCCs were both reactive and proactive depending on the situation. This
answer was not surprising given the way law enforcement officers think. For the most part,
anything that an officer responds to after having been told about it by someone (dispatch, another
officer, or a citizen), they will consider it reactive in nature. Anything an officer does on their
own, without being told to do so, will be considered proactive in nature. Common examples
include speed enforcement, running vehicle license plates looking for stolen vehicles, or
providing extra patrols areas known to have high a incidence of crime. However, these actions
do not meet the definition of proactive policing established by the National Academy of Sciences
because the officers are reacting to or uncovering crimes that are ongoing or crimes that have
already occurred (National Academy of Sciences, 2018). One respondent even said that proactive
policing is not practical because it is impossible to prevent crime. This respondent indicated that
the RTCC merely does what law enforcement officers have always been doing, just more
efficiently and at higher volumes. This sentiment reveals that law enforcement agencies are not
establishing RTCCs to switch from a reactive to proactive model, because in their minds, they
have always been doing both forms of policing and the RTCC merely modernized this process
and made it much more efficient. The preceding examined concepts, developed from Study 1,
can explain the internal and external factors Florida law enforcement agencies were using to
establish RTCCs.
Study 2 specifically dealt with the following research questions:
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1) Is responding to and investigating crime in “real time” the primary reason why Florida
law enforcement agencies are creating RTCCs?
2) Did external factors (e.g., elected officials, clergy, judges, community leaders, etc.) play a
role in Florida law enforcement agencies’ decision to establish an RTCC?
3) Did internal factors play a role in Florida law enforcement agencies’ decision to establish
an RTCC?
4) Do RTCCs stand alone, or if they interact with organizations, with whom do they interact
and how frequently?
As a result of specifically dealing with the research questions, the data collected from this
study specifically address each question. The results from Study 2 strongly suggest that the
primary function of an RTCC is to assist law enforcement officers who are currently in the field
dealing with an active crime or following up on an active crime. This would suggest that
contingency theory would be a primary reason for establishing RTCCs, yet four agencies in this
study were already providing some sort of assistance to officers in the field. To fight crime, at
least two agencies have been using camera systems that were purchased with Homeland Security
grants awarded after 9/11. Another agency had analysts monitoring radio traffic and providing
analytical assistance to officers in the field way before it established an RTCC. Finally, the
agency that gave an interview but did not have an RTCC acknowledged that it is already doing
many of the things associated with an RTCC. These include providing analytical assistance to
officers in the field, but command staff have decided that if the agency is going to establish an
RTCC, it will do so with a full complement of technology. At this point, cost associated with that
technology is the biggest factor for the agency establishing an RTCC.
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With cost being a significant factor, do agencies with RTCCs form IORs with other
organizations? This study revealed that agencies with an RTCC can form IORs with other
governmental agencies. One sheriff’s office has analysts from local police departments in the
agency’s RTCC. The respondent indicated that having analysts from various police departments
facilitates the sharing of information and ensures that responding officers get access to as much
data as possible. In addition to police data, the sheriff’s office gets staffing support. In turn, the
local police departments get access to the RTCC facility and all the technology associated with
it. This arrangement would suggest that reciprocity and efficiency are the primary drivers for this
sort of IOR. What is noteworthy about this relationship is that it was not a factor in the sheriff’s
office deciding to establish an RTCC. The IOR was formed after the RTCC was established and
was an added benefit to the RTCC.
The second instance of partnerships between governmental agencies was a collaborated
effort between three different agencies to form an RTCC. In this RTCC, three different agencies
collaborated to form an RTCC. The sheriff’s office already had an RTCC but decided to partner
with the other two agencies. This decision was made for a variety of reasons, but chief among
them was access for all three agencies to a bigger space, access to each agency’s resources, and
pooled funds that can be used to purchase upgraded technology. This partnership would also
suggest that reciprocity and efficiency was a primary factor in the formation of this IOR.
Another IOR that was present in both studies was public–private partnerships between
the law enforcement agency and private business that allowed access to private business camera
feeds. This public–private partnership was found to be in various stages across various RTCCs
that responded. Some RTCCs had robust public–private partnerships in place with MOUs that
gave RTCCs access to a wealth of information, while others had a one or two businesses that had
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cameras that were being monitored by the RTCC. Other RTCCs were just beginning to explore
the idea of developing a public–private partnership. Regardless of how robust the public–private
partnership was, this study showed that these partnerships are created after the RTCC has been
established and that entering such IORs was not a reason for Florida law enforcement agencies to
establish RTCCs. This finding suggests that some agencies may collaborate with other agencies
to be a part of an RTCC; the vast majority of RTCCs do not consider the tenets of resource
dependency theory when deciding to establish an RTCC.
The external factors and the role they played in the establishment of an RTCC will be
discussed next. All the agencies that had an RTCC acknowledged that no external factors served
a role in their decision to establish an RTCC, and for the most, part elected officials, clergy, and
community leaders were not consulted prior to the agencies’ establishment of an RTCC. This is
not to say that external factors did not materialize after the RTCC was established. Multiple
agencies reported giving elected officials, clergy, and community leaders tours of the RTCC. The
purpose of the tours was to bring legitimacy to the RTCC and show these individuals that law
enforcement organizations are being transparent regarding the operational capabilities of the
RTCC. Several respondents acknowledged that certain law enforcement databases were
purposefully excluded from RTCC operations to maintain the legitimacy of the RTCC. This
provides strong evidence that organizational leaders are cognizant of privacy concerns and are
taking active steps to ensure that the RTCC does not lose legitimacy. This finding would suggest
that the concept of institutional sovereignty did not play a role in an agency’s decision to
establish an RTCC.
Another external factor that did not lead to agencies’ establishing of RTCCs were
criminal events. Criminal events are important external factors when discussing why law
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enforcement agencies change. Major criminal events, such as 9/11, can lead to the development
of completely new organizational concepts. One such entity created because of a criminal event
were fusion centers (Taylor & Russell, 2012). In fact, the very first RTCC was created after the
technology purchased because of 9/11 was repurposed to address an all-crimes approach. One
would expect that at least one agency would cite major criminal events such as the school
shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas or the Pulse night club attack as possible reasons why
agencies created their RTCC, yet no agency did. This would suggest that the external factors
associated with high-profile criminal events do not factor in an agency’s decision to establish an
RTCC. These findings indicate that none of the external factors linked to institutional or
contingency theories played a role in law enforcement agencies’ decision to establish an RTCC.
Now, let us discuss the internal factors associated with an agency’s decision to establish
an RTCC. The first set of internal factors that are examined are associated with contingency
theory. Popular internal factors of contingency theory include the size of the organization (Child,
1975) and the organization’s strategy (Chandler, 1962). The results of this study found little
support for organizational size or organizational strategy plays in an agency’s decision to
establish an RTCC. This study included many large and medium departments that established an
RTCC. There were also large and medium agencies that have not established an RTCC.
Organizational strategy also did not appear to serve a significant role in an agency’s
decision to establish an RTCC. While many of the agencies in this study that have established an
RTCC indicated that they were an ILP agency, there were also ILP agencies that have not
established an RTCC. Furthermore, there were agencies that did not identify as an ILP agency
that have established an RTCC and those that follow a hybrid ILP model or some other model
totally different from ILP that have established an RTCC.
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The next set of internal factors to be discussed are associated with institutional theory.
Popular internal factors linked to institutional theory include isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell
(1991) describe three forms of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. Coercive
isomorphism was not found to be a factor in any of the agencies that were included in this study.
There was, however, an instance of normative isomorphism. A respondent reported that a
sheriff created an RTCC because a police department within the county had created an RTCC.
The sheriff believed it was not appropriate that the sheriff’s office did not have an RTCC when a
local police department had one. The respondent indicated that even though the RTCC existed, it
did not function and was not successful because it was not supported by command staff and
given the necessary resources it needed. No other instances of isomorphism were identified in
this study.
The next internal factor associated with institutional theory is legitimacy. There were no
instances where respondents suggested that their RTCC was created to increase the agency’s
legitimacy. As previously discussed, legitimacy was identified as being important after the
RTCC was established. The internal aspect of legitimacy focused on privacy and not using
computer databases that had been reported in the media as potentially violating people’s privacy
or having strict policies as to when cameras could be utilized. All these internal aspects only
became significant after the RTCC had been established and were not factors considered when
deciding to establish an RTCC.
In the criminal justice literature, institutional isomorphism and legitimacy are often cited
as prominent reasons why criminal justice agencies change, yet in this study, these reasons did
not fully explain why law enforcement agencies were establishing RTCCs. In this study, 53% of
the agencies indicated that a sworn individual in middle management was the driving force
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behind their agency establishing an RTCC. Similar phrases were often used to describe these
individuals and often included words such as forward thinkers, visionaries, always keeping up
with the latest innovations in law enforcement or seeing value in technology. Yet, none of the
criminal justice literature reported this as reason for change. This led the primary researcher to
search for an organizational concept not commonly used in criminal justice literature that could
explain these middle managers being the driving force behind law enforcement agencies’
establishment of an RTCC. This led to the concept of institutional entrepreneurship (DiMaggio
1988; Eisenstadt, 1980).
Eisenstadt (1980) examined the roles elites or institutional entrepreneurs play in the
change that occurred in the social or political systems of traditional civilizations. DiMaggio used
the idea of institutional entrepreneurs to explain how individuals can change institutions despite
the environment wishing to keep things the same (Holm, 1995). Institutional entrepreneurs have
been defined as individuals who bring about institutional change by leveraging resources to
create or cause change within the institution (DiMaggio, 1988). Many of the early studies of
institutional change failed to identify the importance of actors in organizational change. The
concept of institutional actors has slowly gained popularity in the explanation of institutional
change, especially concerning the change stemming from internal factors (Battilana et al., 2009).
Battilana et al. (2009) identified two conditions that must be met for an individual to be
identified as an institutional entrepreneur. The first is that they must initiate change that
significantly alters how the organization does business, referred to as “divergent change.”
Secondly, the individual must actively participate in the change. In this study, both concepts are
present. This study clearly demonstrated that an RTCC involves a divergent change with several
respondents identifying them as game changers. This also revealed that these individuals actively
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participated in the process. Most of the institutional entrepreneurs were in a middle management
position at the agency. The institutional entrepreneurs had the idea to investigate the
establishment of an RTCC. That idea was presented to a member of the agency’s command staff
who gave permission to investigate it further or adopt the concept. The institutional entrepreneur
then actively participated in a variety of ways. While not a complete list, respondents discussed
visiting other RTCCs, testing and evaluating technology, identifying space, making decisions
about staffing, creating policies and procedures, and planning for prolonged rollouts of the
various stages of the RTCC implementation.
Another important factor represents the conditions that must be present for institutional
entrepreneurs to make changes. The two key factors for ideal conditions in which institutional
entrepreneurs can be successful are appropriate conditions and being in the right position within
the agency (Battilana et al., 2009). In this study, both conditions were present. The concept of an
RTCC is well-diffused throughout the law enforcement community, with many agencies in
Florida and in other states having established them. Additionally, technology that increases
efficiency and promotes officer safety is available to most departments. As previously discussed,
the second condition is met by means of the middle manager being in the right position to bring
about the change. While over 80% of the respondents indicated that the availability of
technology was a primary factor for the establishment of their agency’s RTCC, on the surface,
technology appears to be the primary factor for the establishment of RTCCs. However, in almost
all of these cases, a careful reading of the interview transcripts reveals the technology was
acquired after the decision to explore or establish an RTCC. This suggests that in most of the
agencies in this study, the institutional entrepreneur started the agency on the path to establishing
an RTCC.
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Limitations
This descriptive study was limited to those agencies that agreed to an interview with the
primary researcher or completed the instrument and returned it to the primary researcher. As
such, the small sample provides only a small snapshot into certain agencies’ thinking to why they
established an RTCC. Another limitation is the law enforcement agencies themselves. Many law
enforcement officers have developed a unique subculture that emphasizes a different set of
values that those outside the law enforcement community cannot relate to (Fuller, 2006). As a
result of this subculture, many police officers are reluctant to speak with outsiders and even
when they do, they tend to be careful when answering questions. The primary researcher was
able to overcome many of the issues associated with the police subculture because the primary
researcher is an active police officer. This relationship greatly assisted the primary researcher
while conducting the interviews. Multiple respondents indicated that the interview seemed like a
casual conversation between cops as opposed to an academic interview for a graduate-level
degree. This sense of camaraderie however did have drawbacks. On multiple occasions,
respondents indicated that since the primary researcher is a law enforcement officer, he
understood what the respondent was attempting to say and could translate it into academic terms.
These statements would often cause prolonged exchanges to ensure the primary researcher
understood what the respondent was wishing to convey and that he will not make assumptions
based on a shared profession. Another limitation of this study was the lack of interviews with
agency heads.
In organizational research, the ideal candidate to interview regarding an agency’s
decision to establish an RTCC is the agency leader. In the case of law enforcement, that
individual is the sheriff or police chief. Unfortunately, in this study, only one sheriff and one
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police chief was interviewed. The letter sent to the sheriffs or police chiefs stated that the
primary researcher was requesting an interview with the agency head or an individual with
knowledge of the reasons as to why the agency has or has not decided to establish an RTCC.
Many of the respondents told the primary researcher they had been given permission to
participate in the study by the sheriff or police chief. Finally, a few respondents indicated
questions they did not know the answer to and asked the sheriff or police chief for an appropriate
answer. For these reasons, it was not necessary to exclude any respondents from the analysis. No
other limitations were encountered during the study, and all the responding agencies cooperated
in the study and placed no additional stipulations or conditions on the primary researcher.
A criticism of this study could be that it is descriptive in nature. The descriptive nature of
the study may have allowed respondents to provide socially acceptable answers or answers the
respondent believed the primary investigator wished to hear. Additionally, the respondents may
have provided answers to questions that were not accurate or truthful as to the reasons why their
agency established an RTCC. Given the research design of this study, the primary research had
no option than to accept what was reported in the newspaper articles or said in the interviews.
Another criticism of this study could be that a quantitative study could have been employed
instead of a qualitative study. A quantitative study was considered but given the lack of research
on criminal justice organizations’ decision for or against establishing an RTCC, a qualitative
study was ultimately selected. This decision was largely based on the ability to interact with the
respondents to really capture thoughts and explore themes and concepts that organically
materialize throughout the course of the interviews.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The RTCC is a relatively new concept in the annals of law enforcement history. Spurred
by tragedy, RTCCs were created by one of the largest law enforcement organizations in the
United States. Since these beginnings, the concept of RTCCs has diffused across law
enforcement agencies of various sizes all over the United States. This study focused on
explaining why law enforcement agencies are creating RTCCs. Interviews with law enforcement
personnel were conducted, and with a set of answers to questions, organizational theories dealing
with adaptive changes were applied to these answers to see if any of the theories could explain
why agencies are establishing RTCCs.
To bring a level of order to the data, possible reasons from each theory were further
divided into internal and external factors. This study showed that internal and external factors
such as institutional pressures, agency legitimacy, adapting to task environments, isomorphism,
or contingencies like agency size or budget could not fully explain an agency’s decisions to
establish an RTCC. Furthermore, popular reasons for establishing IORs such as reciprocity and
efficiency (Oliver, 1990) were discussed in detail during the interviews but were often cited as a
benefit of the RTCC and not as a reason for its establishment.
The unique finding of this study was “agency champions” represent the biggest cause for
the establishment of RTCCs. The idea that “agency champions” are a reason for change did not
appear in the criminal justice literature reviewed for this study. As a result, when it became
apparent that middle managers were mostly responsible for the establishment of RTCCs in many
of the organizations included in this study, a search for an explanation was begun. What was found
was a term in criminal justice literature, namely institutional entrepreneurship, which had not been
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previously researched in the criminal justice peer-reviewed literature. The idea suggests that an
individual can see an emerging trend, see the value in that trend, take ownership of the idea, and
work toward implementing the idea at the law enforcement agency. This describes exactly what
was noted in many of the interviews. Individuals who saw the potential that having technology
could increase officer safety, make the law enforcement agency more efficient, and solve crimes
that in the past may never have been solved subsequently decided to work with their chain of
command to establish their agency’s RTCC.

Future Research
Organizational research on RTCCs is not very well established. This study was meant to
provide a foundational explanation as to why Florida law enforcement agencies are establishing
RTCCs. Based on the findings of this study, it is apparent that more research into RTCCs is
necessary. In this study, only two agencies that currently do not have RTCCs provided data. As of
this writing, there were 19 sheriff’s offices that had RTCCs and 48 Florida sheriff’s offices that
did not. These agencies can provide a counterpoint to the agencies that participated in this study.
There are also myriad possibilities of the effectiveness of RTCCs. RTCCs are expensive, and if
they are not keeping officers safe or providing added benefits to law enforcement agencies, then
law enforcement agencies’ heads should be made aware of that. Finally, agencies would benefit if
they understood what effects or deterrents RTCCs have on crime, if any. All these questions have
been researched with other aspects of law enforcement programs, and there is no reason to believe
that RTCCs would not benefit from the same level of research.
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Table 1 Summary of Adaptive Organizational Theories
Theory

Main Reason for Change
Internal Factors

External Factors

Contingency Theory

Agencies must adapt to changes in the
environment in order to ensure fit. Fit
ensures agency effectiveness

Organizational Strategy
Organizational Size
Organizational Jurisdiction

Changes in the Environment
Changes in Tasks
Changes in Technology

Resource Dependency Theory

In order to be seen as legitimate
agencies must partner with other
agencies to acquire needed resources.
Those with control over the resource
are seen as more legitimate and has
having more power over the agency
seeking the resource

Resource Dependency Theory
is all about external factors

Changes in environment
Changes in Power Structure
Uncertainty of Resources

Institutional Theory

To gain legitimacy organizations
acquire must acquire resources;
however, unlike resource dependency
theory there are internal factors that
drive the need to acquire resources

To become more like other
agencies (isomorphism)
Change brought about by
agency personnel

Change in order to appear
more legitimate to stakeholders
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Table 2 Study 2 Description of Survey Recipients and Respondents

Survey
Recipients
N

Survey
Respondents
n (%)

Sheriff's Offices with an RTCC

18

7 (38%)

Sheriff's Offices without an RTCC

20

2 (10%)

Police Departments with an RTCC

11

4 (36%)

University Police Departments
With an RTCC

1

0 (0%)

University Police Departments
Without an RTCC

3

0 (0%)

Total

53

13 (24%)

Type of Law Enforcement Agency
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1) Would you consider your agency to be an intelligence led policing Agency?
For this interview intelligence led policing will be defined as:
“[t]he collection and analysis of information related to crime and
conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable
intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in
developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning
related to emerging or changing threats (Carter, 2009, p.13)”1
Probing Question: What do you particularly like about being an
intelligence led policing agency?
2) Did your law enforcement agency have an intelligence component prior to the
establishment of a RTCC?
3) If not, was the intelligence unit created when the RTCC was established?
Probing Question: Why do you feel it was necessary to create an
intelligence unit in addition to the RTCC?
4) If the agency had an intelligence unit, was it rebranded as an RTCC?
Probing Question: Why was rebranding your intelligence unit as an
RTCC the right decision for your agency?
5) If so, does the intelligence unit still exist?

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Law Enforcement
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, David L. Carter,
2nd ed. (May, 2009): 80, accessed February 7, 2022, https://it.ojp.gov/documents/d/e050919201IntelGuide_web.pdf; Ibid; and Thomas E. Baker, Intelligence-Led Policing (Flushing, NY:
Looseleaf Law Publications, 2009): 43.
1
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a. Was the intelligence Unit added under the umbrella of the RTCC?
b. If the intelligence unit was rebranded as an RTCC what steps were done to create
an RTCC?
c. If the intelligence unit still exists how has the Intelligence Unit mission changed
with the addition of a RTCC?
d. Explain what has stayed the same.
6) Was the primary reason the RTCC was established a criminal event?
a. If so, what was the nature of the event?
b. What was significant about this event that your agency felt it was necessary to
create a RTCC?
7) If the primary reason for the creation of the RTCC was something other than a criminal
event, could you explain what was the reason? (Contingency Theory)
Probing Question: Could you briefly explain why your agency felt it was necessary to
establish a RTCC?
8) What are the primary functions of the RTCC?
a. What is the composition of the staff that work in the RTCC?
i. If sworn law enforcement work in the RTCC what is their primary job?
ii. Do analyst complete requests for other sections of the agency?
iii. Do analyst complete requests for other agencies?
9) How has a RTCC changed the way your agency operates?
a. Would you consider this change a good change or bad change?
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Probing Question: Could you give me an example of how having an RTCC has changed
the way your agency operates?
10) What benefits have you seen as a result of the establishment of a RTCC?
Probing Question: Could you elaborate on these benefits and how they have improved your
agency?
11) What are some negative aspects of establishing a RTCC?
Probing Question: Do you feel that these negative aspects have had a major impact on how
your agency operates?
12) Does your agency keep records of RTCC success stories or statistics on the number of
criminal events in which RTCC resources were utilized?
a. Have you seen a significant use in the resources or capabilities offered by the
RTCC?
Probing Question: Do you feel that the significant use of these resources or capabilities has
helped or hurt your agency?

13) Who in your agency was the primary person/role responsible for the implementation of the
RTCC? (Institutional Theory, Sovereigns)
a. How did they become aware of the concept of a RTCC?
i. If a conference or trade show what was the name?
ii. If it was another agency, what was the agency?
iii. Was it another state?
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14) Describe the timeframe from conception to implementation of the RTCC? (Resource
Dependency Theory)
a. Did the Sheriff or Police Chief seek outside approval for the creation of the RTCC
i. If so, from who? (Board of County Commission or Mayor’s Office)?
b. What was the time frame from conception to implementation?
i. If there was a delay what was the cause of the delay?
15) How is the RTCC primarily funded? (Resource Dependency Theory)
a. Were grant funds used to pay for the RTCC?
b. Was the RTCC established because of the availability of grant funds?
c. If so, who wrote/what role wrote the grant?
d. (If external) Had you used this organization to write previous grants?
16) Were community organizations or leaders’ input sought before the implementation of the
RTCC? (Institutional Theory)
a. If community organizations or leaders’ input was sought before the implementation
of a RTCC why was their input sought?
b. To the best of your recollection did the entity express support or reservations about
the creation of the RTCC?
i. If the organization expressed reservations what were the reservations?
Probing Question: Could you elaborate on why you thought it was necessary to seek input
form the community regarding the establishment of the RTCC?
17) Have other agencies contacted you regarding the implementation of a RTCC? If yes:
(Institutional Theory, Isomorphism)
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a. Are they located in Florida?
b. If located outside of Florida, what state are they located?
18) Is there anything else that I have not asked you that you feel is important regarding your
agency’s decision to establish a RTCC?
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